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RULE OF LAW OPERATIONS IN THE 
COMBAT ENVIRONMENT: A JUDGE 
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE AS A 
LEGAL MENTOR IN AFGHANISTAN 
SHOHNA BA SHOHNA 
By Thomas J. Bogar 
INTRODUCTION 
efore U.S. and coalition forces can withdraw from Af-
ghanistan and declare the military mission a success, the 
Afghan National Security Forces (“ANSF”)1 must first be able 
to self-sustain and defend its country from the insurgency that 
has plagued Afghanistan for the last ten years. Getting the 
ANSF to that level, however, will require significant training, 
partnering, and mentoring. As a consequence, training the 
ANSF has now become a key component of U.S. foreign policy 
for Afghanistan and of the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from the region.2 The responsibility for training the ANSF falls 
to the greatest degree upon the United States and its coalition 
partners through NATO’s principal command, the Internation-
al Security Assistance Forces (“ISAF”).3 
Until February 2010, the Combined Security Transition 
Command–Afghanistan (“CSTC–A”), led by the United States, 
                                                                                                             
 B.S., May 1985, Dickinson College, J.D., May 1992, Seattle University 
School of Law, LL.M., December 1993, Villanova University School of Law, 
LL.M., January 2008, The George Washington University School of Law. The 
author served on active duty April to October 2011 as a Lieutenant Colonel, 
Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, assigned as a legal mentor to the 207th Corps for 
the Afghan National Army, Herat, Afghanistan. The opinions expressed are 
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 1. The ANSF is made of two parts: the Afghan National Army (“ANA”) 
and the Afghan National Police (“ANP”). KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30588, AFGHANISTAN: POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, 
SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY 23 (Apr. 15, 2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. at 23–24. 
B
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coordinated the training of the ANSF.4 The CSTC–A was later 
combined with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan 
(“NTM–A”), a command primarily focused on building the insti-
tutional capacity of the ANSF and training its recruits.5 
Key to training the ANSF are partnering, or mentoring, 
teams, comprising mentors provided by NATO who pair with 
their Afghan counterparts in positions of all ranks—from as 
high as the Ministry of Defense, to the Afghan National Army 
(“ANA”) Corps, down to the Brigades and Companies.6 Each 
ANA Corps, for example, has a Judiciary and Staff Judge Ad-
vocate (the “Corps SJA” or “SJA”), who serves as the principal 
legal advisor to the Corps Commander.7 As part of NATO’s 
mentoring team, a legal mentor, who is usually a field-grade 
U.S. Judge Advocate, partners with the Corps SJA and is prin-
cipally responsible for training him and his staff, together 
forming the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (“OSJA”).8 I 
served as an ANA legal mentor for the 207th ANA Corps in 
Herat for six months in 2011. 
Although others have written about mentoring SJAs, very lit-
tle has been said since 2007.9 Much has changed in Afghani-
stan since then, not just from an operational standpoint, but 
also from a policy perspective, including the significance of the 
                                                                                                             
 4. See id. at 23. 
 5. See id. at 23–24. 
 6. There are currently seven established Corps throughout Afghanistan: 
the 201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 209th, 215th, and the 111th Division. JOINT 
CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. FORCE ASSISTANCE, AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) 
MENTOR GUIDE 2–21 (2011) [hereinafter ANA GUIDE] (on file with author). 
The 201st is located in Kabul; the 203rd in Gardez; the 205th in Kandahar; 
the 207th in Herat; the 209th in Mazar-e-Sharif; the 215th in Lashkar Gah; 
and the 111th Division in the Capital. Afghan National Army (ANA)–Order of 
Battle, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ana-orbat.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
 7. See ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 2–20. 
 8. See Daniel J. Hill & Kevin Jones, Mentoring Afghan National Army 
Judge Advocates: An Operational Law Mission in Afghanistan and Beyond, 
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2007, at 12, 13 n.18. When I left Afghanistan in October 
2011, there was one Canadian Army Major serving as a legal mentor, two 
U.S. Navy Commanders, one U.S. Air Force Colonel, and three U.S. Army 
Lieutenant Colonels. 
 9. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8; Sean M. Watts & Christopher E. Mar-
tin, Nation-Building in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified in Military Justice 
Reform, ARMY LAW., May 2006. 
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mentor mission. For these reasons, I consider it important to 
revisit the topic and include my experience and lessons learned 
to benefit future Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal men-
tors. 
Before deploying as ANA legal mentors, Judge Advocates 
should understand some basic concepts needed for a successful 
mission. Because legal mentors will interact frequently with 
the ANA (not just with the SJA, his staff, and the judges, but 
also with many non-legal ANA officers, including the Corps 
Commander), they should have a good understanding of Af-
ghan history and culture, the ANA military and civilian legal 
systems, and some basic Dari.10 A cursory understanding of 
these topics will not be enough for mission success, because 
laws do not exist in isolation. They are shaped by the political, 
cultural, and economic characteristics of the society to which 
they apply. Previous mentors have learned that a lack of cul-
tural awareness can be a major obstacle to mission success. 
Consequently, legal mentors must gain insight into Afghan so-
cial norms and nuances for rule of law programs to succeed. 
Part I of this Essay provides some basic background infor-
mation for deploying Judge Advocates; Part II addresses signif-
icant challenges that ANA legal mentors face; Part III suggests 
solutions or approaches to those challenges; and finally, a Con-
clusion offers some closing remarks. 
I. BACKGROUND 
As previously mentioned, NATO’s top command in Afghani-
stan is ISAF, currently commanded by U.S. Army General 
                                                                                                             
 10. This Essay is not intended to provide the requisite level of understand-
ing on these topics for prospective ANA legal mentors. Rather, it is intended 
to provide a brief overview so Judge Advocates can continue their course of 
self-study before deploying. To learn more about the topics, see generally 
THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (2010); 
EHSAN M. ENTEZAR, AFGHANISTAN 101: UNDERSTANDING AFGHAN CULTURE 
(2007); MARTIN EWANS, AFGHANISTAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE AND 
POLITICS (2002); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA’S 
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009) (discussing the rise of the insurgency in Afghani-
stan from a historical and structural perspective); BARNETT R. RUBIN, THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE FORMATION AND COLLAPSE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2002); STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A 
MILITARY HISTORY FROM ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN 
(2002). 
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John Allen.11 The task of training the ANA falls squarely on 
ISAF.12 
According to its mission statement, ISAF “conducts opera-
tions in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the in-
surgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate im-
provements in governance and socio-economic development in 
order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability 
that is observable to the population.”13 Subordinate to ISAF are 
two commands, each led by a U.S. Lieutenant General: NTM–A 
and ISAF Joint Command (“IJC”).14 
On the one hand, NTM–A “oversees [the] training and equip-
ping of Afghan [security] forces throughout Afghanistan.”15 It 
also develops military doctrine for the ANA and provides high-
level training, via defense colleges and academic institutions, 
for ANA senior officials.16 
At the operational level, Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Teams (“OMLTs”) mentor ANA troops by focusing on building 
the capability and scope of the ANA.17 OMLTs are essentially 
multi-disciplinary ISAF military forces that fall under the pur-
view of IJC. By “co-ordinating the planning of operations and 
ensuring that the ANA units receive necessary enabling sup-
port,” OMLTs provide training, mentoring, and liaison services 
between ANA and ISAF forces.18 In October 2010, 150 OMLTs 
                                                                                                             
 11. See About ISAF: Leadership, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/leadership.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 12. See About ISAF: Mission, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Subordinate Commands, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/news/5.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). The NTM–A 
was formerly known as the Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC–
A). See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
 15. NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
FORCE, http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/nato-training-
mission-afghanistan/index.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 16. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE 
ADVOCATES 71 (Ctr. for Law & Military Operations, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army ed., 4th ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2010.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Public Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet: NATO’s Operational Mentor and 
Liaison Teams (OMLTs), N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (June 2010), 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/omlt-factsheet.pdf [hereinafter Pub-
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were operating within Afghanistan, seventy-six of which were 
from the United States.19 
On the other hand, the IJC “conducts population-centric 
comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in speci-
fied areas, and supports improved governance and development 
in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure en-
vironment for sustainable peace.”20 
Thus, while NTM–A and OMLTs are ISAF’s training and 
equipping arm, the IJC is ISAF’s operational arm.21 As a com-
parison, Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal mentors are 
detailed to IJC as part of ISAF’s operational arm in much the 
same way the ANA Corps SJA is part of the ANA operational 
arm. 
A. A Brief History of Afghanistan 
Afghanistan has on more than one occasion been referred to 
as the “graveyard to empires.”22 History explains how it has 
earned this moniker. 
Since the time of Alexander the Great, Afghanistan has been 
the battleground for several empires and the crossroads for 
many conquerors.23 The nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentieth century saw Afghanistan as a critical strategic 
piece to the “Great Game” played between Russia and Brit-
ain.24 It was then that Afghanistan engaged in three Anglo-
                                                                                                             
lic Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet]. Each OMLT team is staffed with eleven to 
twenty-eight personnel from one to several countries. Id. 
 19. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 24. For the ANP, the partnership teams are 
called the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (“POMLTs”) and 
are staffed with fifteen to twenty personnel each. Id. In October 2010, 317 
POMLTs were operating in Afghanistan; 279 were from the United States. 
Id. 
 20. ISAF Joint Command, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-
command/index.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 21. Id. OMLTs also serve as liaisons between coalition forces and ANA 
forces during operations. Public Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet, supra note 18. 
Perhaps it is because the OMLTs serve as liaisons for operations that they 
are part of IJC. 
 22. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 23. JONES, supra note 10, at xxv–xxviii; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 24. JONES, supra note 10, at xxvi; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 177–82. 
244 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
Afghan wars, which eventually led to Afghan independence 
from Britain on August 8, 1919.25 
During the middle of the twentieth century (1933–1973), Af-
ghanistan was ruled by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.26 Under 
his rule, Afghanistan adopted a constitution, formed a national 
legislature, and afforded women unprecedented freedoms.27 It 
was also during this period of relative peace when King Zahir 
allied Afghanistan with the Soviet Union.28 Through its politi-
cal and arms-purchase relationship with Afghanistan, the So-
viet Union built large infrastructure projects throughout Af-
ghanistan, inter alia, the north-south Salang Pass/Tunnel and 
Bagram airfield, many of which remain today.29 
Following a bloodless coup in 1973,30 the country succumbed 
to instability “when diametrically opposed Communist Party 
and Islamic movements grew in strength.”31 The instability 
mounted until December 27, 1979, when the Soviet Union sent 
troops into Afghanistan to prevent Islamic militias, or mujahe-
din, from seizing power.32 For the next twenty years, Afghani-
stan remained in an almost continuous state of armed con-
flict.33 
In the years following the Soviet defeat in 1989, civil war 
among formerly allied mujahedin leaders caused the destruc-
tion of most of the country’s infrastructure.34 The constant 
state of war and lawlessness created an ideal situation for the 
Taliban to seize power by promising to restore order in ex-
change for rule (1996–2001).35 
                                                                                                             
 25. KATZMAN supra note 1, at 1; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 115–
46, 181–82; JONES, supra note 10, at 6–8; RUBIN, supra note 10, at 19, 47–54. 
 26. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id.; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 209–10; JONES, supra note 
10, at 9; RUBIN, supra note 10, at 65–66; TANNER, supra note 10, 225–27. 
 30. TANNER, supra note 10, at 229. 
 31. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 2. 
 32. Id.; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 211, 234; JONES, supra note 
10, at 11–19; TANNER, supra note 10, at 229–35. 
 33. See JONES, supra note 10, at xii–xiii; TANNER, supra note 10, at 243–
287. 
 34. See BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 6; JONES, supra note 10, at 41–43, 49–
51; TANNER, supra note 10, at 269–83. 
 35. See BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 6–7; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 5; 
TANNER, supra note 10, at 279–87. 
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The presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s 
refusal to extradite bin Laden for his complicity in the 9/11 at-
tacks led to the eventual U.S. invasion and removal of the Tali-
ban from power. More than ten years later, the United States 
and its NATO allies remain locked in Afghanistan.36 
These last thirty years of war in Afghanistan are well docu-
mented and have left the country with a weak central govern-
ment and an economy that ranks as one of the worst in the 
world.37 Afghanistan today remains largely dependent on for-
eign aid,38 with little to no infrastructure, scant potable water, 
scarce electricity, and a citizenry plagued with meager health 
conditions and little or poor medical care.39 In all, 40% of the 
country is unemployed, 72% is illiterate,40 and less than 15% of 
the land is arable, all leading to a significant reliance on an 
opium trade that supplies 80% of the world’s opium and ac-
counts for 60% of Afghanistan’s GDP.41 
B. The Culture: A Basic Foundation 
It has often been said that a people’s culture develops from 
its history and that culture, in turn, defines a people. Just as it 
is important to know its history, understanding Afghanistan’s 
culture may help mentors understand why Afghans act a cer-
tain way or even anticipate how they may act.42 
Attempting to define Afghans as one homogeneous culture 
would be an oversimplification of a very complicated reality; 
there are just too many variations of ethnicity, tribes, sub-
tribes, and villages.43 Thus, rather than learn cultural nuances, 
the study of which could take years of training, legal mentors 
should instead try to grasp and understand cultural commonal-
                                                                                                             
 36. BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 318–20, 333–36. 
 37. Cent. Intelligence Agency [CIA], Afghanistan, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Lieutenant Commander Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law 
in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategic Paradigm, 7 ARMY LAW. 45, 52 
(2007). 
 40. CIA, supra note 37. 
 41. Tasikas, supra note 39 at 52. 
 42. Afghan Culture: Observations, Insights, and Lessons, AFG. CULTURE 
NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.), Sept. 
2010, at 67, available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-64/10-64.pdf. 
 43. See id. 
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ities particular to the region to which they are assigned.44 The 
location of the ANA Corps to which a mentor is assigned will be 
indicative of the prevalent ethnicities, tribes, and villages pre-
sent in the Corps. 
For instance, in Afghanistan these commonalities include the 
following: 
[1] [t]ribal and Islamic cultures are traditional and conserva-
tive[;] 
[2] [t]ribal codes (honor, revenge, and hospitality) are social 
controls[;] 
[3] [t]ribal identity and loyalty . . . take precedence over indi-
vidual identity and private loyalty)[;] 
[4] [s]elf-interest and personal gain outweigh the fear of retri-
bution or legal/punitive action and hypocrisy or loss of re-
spect[;] 
[5] [a Jirgah or a Shura often make decisions, depending up-
on the circumstance;] 
[6] [t]he most important duty of an Afghan man is to defend 
and control his assets: women, gold and land[;] 
[7] [h]ospitality is an essential aspect of Afghan culture.45 
By studying and understanding these cultural commonalities, 
mentors will be better prepared to successfully carry out their 
mission. 
Ultimately, when trying to understand Afghan conduct, men-
tors should keep in mind that God, family, village, and tribe all 
take priority before country or nation.46 Understanding this 
crucial concept will go a long way, particularly when encoun-
tering widespread government corruption, which is discussed 
later. 
C. The Law 
Judge Advocates deploying as legal mentors should also be 
well versed in relevant military and civil Afghan law. Afghani-
stan’s history of war and occupation has left an indelible im-
pression upon its people, particularly in their failure to apply 
                                                                                                             
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 67–68. 
 46. See ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 1-4; ENTEZAR, supra note 10, at 75–77. 
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the rule of law. This is especially evident with the people’s al-
most cavalier acceptance of high-level government and military 
corruption.47 But by knowing Afghanistan’s history and under-
standing its culture, mentors will soon realize how law has now 
become more relevant and why it is as intertwined with Af-
ghanistan’s culture as it is with its history. 
There are five sources of law in Afghanistan: (1) Islamic law; 
(2) the 2004 Constitution; (3) codes, decrees, and legislation; (4) 
international treaties and covenants; and (5) various regula-
tions and orders.48 Above all other laws, however, Islamic law 
takes precedence.49 In fact, the Afghan Constitution specifically 
provides that “no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of 
Islam.”50 
The law applicable to the ANA is found in several codes of 
military justice.51 Although initially based upon the United 
States Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), the ANA 
codes have since been revised to instill Afghan culture and 
standards.52 The codes, or laws of military justice, were written 
to reinforce the significance of the rule of law within the ANA 
and emphasize a well-disciplined and combat-ready army.53 
Echoing article 3 of the Afghan Constitution, nothing within 
the ANA codes can be contrary to Islam or Shari’a; in fact, the 
codes specifically permit Shari’a, as well as the Afghan Civil 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Kevin T. Carroll, Afghan Corruption—The Greatest Obstacle to 
Victory in Operation Enduring Freedom, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 873, 876–83. 
 48. See Muslim Law Systems and Mixed Systems With A Muslim Law 
Tradition, JURIGLOBE, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-
musulman.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN [AFGHAN CONSTITUTION], Jan. 26, 2004, available 
at 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20
Constitution.pdf. 
 49. AFGHAN CONSTITUTION art. 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14 & n.24. The Afghan Constitution 
removes the military courts from the Afghan civil judicial system. AFGHAN 
CONSTITUTION art. 122. 
 52. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14. Unlike the UCMJ, the ANA mili-
tary justice codes are not consolidated in one document. Rather, the ANA 
military justice code is comprised of several codes, which incorporate by ref-
erence the Afghan Civil Code and Shari’a law. Those ANA codes are: (1) Af-
ghan National Army Law of Military Courts (“LMC”); (2) Military Criminal 
Procedure Code (“MCPC”); and (3) Military Crimes Code (“MCC”). 
 53. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 16. 
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Penal Code, to supplement the ANA codes when offenses are 
not specified.54 
Three separate provisions make up the ANA military justice 
codes, each of which will be discussed in turn: 
1. the Law of Military Courts Code (“LMC”), which contains 
eighteen articles within seven chapters and determines 
the authority and jurisdiction of the military courts;55 
2. the Military Criminal Procedure Code (“MCPC”), which 
contains sixty-one articles within seven chapters and reg-
ulates the criminal investigation process in the military;56 
and 
3. the Military Crimes Code (“MCC”), which contains forty-
eight articles within three chapters and establishes mili-
tary crimes and punishment within the military.57 
The LMC establishes the ANA military court system.58 It de-
fines the roles of prosecutors, military judges, and defense 
counsel.59 It also designates primary military trial courts and a 
military court of appeals,60 with “exclusive jurisdiction of pure-
ly military offenses committed by members of the [ANA].” 61 
Appeal from the ANA military court of appeals is made to the 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan.62 
The MCPC is authorized pursuant to article 8(B) of the 
LMC.63 Within its sixty-one articles, the MCPC regulates the 
                                                                                                             
 54. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE [MCPC] 
art. 47 (on file with author); see also Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14. 
 55. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY LAW OF MILITARY COURTS [LMC] (on file with 
author). The Afghan Ministry of Justice has not yet published or officially 
distributed the Law of Military Courts in its Official Gazette. 
 56. MCPC. 
 57. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY MILITARY CRIMES CODE [MCC] (on file with 
author). 
 58. LMC art. 1. 
 59. Id. art. 8. 
 60. Id. art. 7. 
 61. Id. art. 9(A). However, there may be instances when the military 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the civilian courts when “persons 
subject to [the LMC] commit acts which are offenses under both military and 
civilian law,” or over persons not otherwise members of the ANA. See LMC 
arts. 2, 9. 
 62. Id. art. 15. 
 63. Although article 1 of the MCPC recites articles 122 and 134 of the Af-
ghan Constitution as its authority, article 8(B) of the LMC empowers the 
Minister of Defense with the authority to “establish written procedures and 
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“procedures relating to discovery, investigation and trial of du-
ty related crimes” allegedly committed by ANA soldiers,64 much 
like the due process articles found in the UCMJ.65 
The MCC is more or less a revision of a former Soviet-era mil-
itary justice code.66 The MCC outlines the elements of various 
military crimes, as well as their associated confinement 
terms.67 In addition to crimes typical of a military crimes 
code—such as desertion, mutiny, and absent-without-leave 
(“AWOL”)—the MCC contains crimes specific to Afghanistan, 
to wit, corruption and violations pertaining to the operation of 
vehicles68 and selling or losing combat equipment.69 Further-
more, the MCC incorporates all crimes punishable under the 
Afghan Civil Penal Code and Islamic law.70 In such instances, 
jurisdiction may lie with either a military or civilian court.71 
For these reasons, legal mentors need to have some under-
standing of the ANA codes, the Afghan Civil Penal Code, and 
basic Islamic law. 
II. CHALLENGES WHEN ADVISING THE ANA 
A. Advising the ANA—What is Mentoring? 
Before discussing the kinds of challenges Judge Advocates 
should expect to encounter when mentoring the ANA, it is 
probably best to first cover, in greater detail, what it means to 
“mentor.” 
In Afghanistan, legal mentors provide training guidance, 
administrative advice, as well as advice to the SJA and his 
staff on routine and non-routine legal matters. Legal mentors 
also serve as experts for or advisors to the SJA, OSJA, and 
Corps judiciary when cases are complex or potentially involve 
political interference, or when help from a third party is need-
                                                                                                             
rules of military courts in accordance with the constitution and the laws of 
Afghanistan.” Id. art. 8(B); see also Watts & Martin, supra note 9, at 6. 
 64. MCPC art. 1. 
 65. Watts & Martin, supra note 9, at 7. For a good overview of the MCPC, 
see id. at 7–9. 
 66. See id. at 9. 
 67. MCC arts. 9, 12–47. 
 68. Id. art. 30. 
 69. Id. arts. 35, 36. 
 70. See id. art. 47. 
 71. Id. 
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ed. Keeping in mind U.S. policy for Afghanistan, the mentor 
mission is consistent with the principal objective of developing 
each Corps OSJA into a self-sufficient legal office, with the ca-
pacity to conduct thorough and impartial internal investiga-
tions.72 That, in turn, will lead to good order and discipline 
within the Corps’ ranks and eventually to the Corps’ assuming 
responsibility for security in its respective region. 
The most critical kind of mentoring that legal mentors pro-
vide is legal training to the OSJA so that they can then provide 
legal training to the ANA soldiers. Some of the topics covered 
during training sessions taught by ANA Judge Advocates in-
clude the rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, non-
judicial punishment, and ethics. These issues seem to be the 
ones that resonate most frequently through the ANA. Ensuring 
each Corps understands and complies with the laws of armed 
conflict will better prepare Afghanistan for the day when the 
ANA accepts responsibility for the security of all Afghanistan. 
Legal mentors also provide administrative guidance. More 
specifically, they advise on tasks required for running a legal 
office. These tasks may include completing supply requisitions 
(a form called a MOD 14 in the ANA system), non-
commissioned officer evaluation reports, counseling state-
ments, investigation reports, or statements for non-judicial 
punishment.73 Administrative training and advice may also en-
tail showing the ANA how to track and catalogue regulations 
and orders or how to organize case management files. 
In addition to administrative advice, legal mentors may ad-
vise on a number of other matters as well. These matters may 
be legal (e.g., strategy for a particular case), political (e.g., deal-
ing with a particular commander who is reluctant to submit to 
a criminal investigation), logistical (e.g., difficulty obtaining 
supplies through the MOD 14 process),74 or operation-
                                                                                                             
 72. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 17–19. 
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al/intelligence-related (e.g., issues related to the Taliban, sus-
pected threats, or foreign agents acting in theater). In these 
instances, legal mentors should be prepared to provide ad hoc 
advice, whether it is to the SJA, prosecutors, defense counsel, 
or commanders. It is imperative, however, that legal mentors 
never tell their principals what to do; advice should be given as 
a suggestion, or even as a question, so the Afghans can claim 
ownership of and responsibility for the final decision.75 
As each OSJA develops, the SJA’s relevance to his respective 
Corps Commander will increase so that eventually each OSJA 
will be responsible for not only military justice matters, but al-
so for rendering legal advice on administrative, fiscal, and op-
erational matters.76 
But mentoring is more than simply providing advice. It is al-
so about developing relationships with the ANA. The job, in a 
sense, is oftentimes more diplomatic than legal. This is part of 
the reason mentors who aim to better engage their principals 
must understand Afghan history and culture. When mentors 
engage their principals, everyone in the OSJA feels empowered 
knowing that they have their mentor’s support.77 Over time, a 
sense of trust will develop between the mentor and his princi-
pals, which is crucial to the success of the mentor’s mission. 
Trust, however, must be earned, not purchased by furnishing 
material goods (an error committed in the past, for example, 
with office furniture, wide-screen TVs, and vehicles) or making 
shallow promises. The trust I refer to is only attained through 
the development of an honest, professional relationship. Never-
theless, mentors must master the delicate balance between de-
veloping a trustworthy, professional relationship with their 
ANA colleagues and fulfilling their primary duty of service to 
their country. 
                                                                                                             
have been exhausted through the normal ANA chain of commands should 
mentors step in with assistance. See id. 
 75. In many instances, particularly with corruption cases, commanders or 
ANA judge advocates will tell defendants that they do not want to prosecute 
or investigate, but are being forced to do so by American advisors. Any per-
ception of American influence on case disposition places the mentor into a 
precarious position. It is better to make it known that decisions are made by 
the Afghans and that mentors are there to provide suggestions and advise. 
 76. When I left the 207th in October 2011, the SJA was just starting to 
review operational plans for legal sufficiency. 
 77. See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK , supra note 16, at 276. 
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B. Challenges when Mentoring the ANA 
Evidently, mentoring has its particular challenges. Helping 
to establish a functional, stand-alone, and credible military and 
OSJA in the midst of an insurgency accompanied by terrorism, 
criminal activity, and routine government corruption is one of 
the greatest challenges any attorney could ever face. However, 
knowing and understanding the challenges beforehand will 
help Judge Advocates to adjust accordingly and succeed in this 
challenging mission. 
1. Ethnicity 
Ethnicity presents an important type of cultural challenge.78 
Ethnic issues are prevalent throughout Afghanistan and are 
mirrored within the ANA. Working within an ethnically di-
verse ANA presents a unique and difficult challenge for legal 
mentors because of the prejudices that exist among the various 
ethnic groups.79 
Afghans are historically a multiethnic people and devoutly 
loyal to their tribal or ethnic affiliations.80 Consequently, ethnic 
discrimination plagues all ranks of the ANA.81 Commanders, 
and even those higher in the chain of command, often manipu-
late subordinates of differing ethnicity, while subordinates, 
particularly the largest group—Pashtuns—likewise manipulate 
commanders of minority ethnicity, such as Hazara.82 
In the military justice context, ethnic discrimination appears 
rampant. There have been examples of commanders issuing 
non-judicial punishment (“NJP”)83 inequitably based on ethnic-
                                                                                                             
 78. “An ethnic group is a large group of people with a common racial, na-
tional, tribal, linguistic, religious, or cultural origin or background.” Afghan 
Culture, supra note 42, at 68. “Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups are defined 
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gion, geography, history, politics, and/or tribes.” Id. at 69. 
 79. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-4 to 3-5. 
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 81. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-5. 
 82. See id. 
 83. A form of punishment given administratively by commanders for minor 
military infractions. 
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ity. In criminal justice matters more serious than NJP, com-
manders and even prosecutors have protected or obstructed in-
vestigations of soldiers because of ethnic allegiances. Ethnic 
prejudice is also apparent when cases are detailed to prosecu-
tors or when judgments or sentences are handed down by judg-
es. Although most ANA leaders and soldiers will deny this dis-
crimination exists, tribal or ethnic authority pervades the 
ANA. 
When cultural or ethnic discrimination is suspected, mentors 
should try to instill national values and support for the rule of 
law as paramount to ethnicity.84 
2. Intimidation 
Influence through intimidation has become an accepted prac-
tice in the ANA and presents another challenge for legal men-
tors.85 Those seeking to influence a particular individual might 
intimidate that person directly or indirectly through threats to 
his or her family.86 Although commanders, soldiers, or witness-
es may want to do what is legally right, they are often con-
strained in their ability to do so because of fear for their or 
their family’s safety.87 
More often than not, intimidation is the reason many corrup-
tion cases or high-profile military justice cases are dismissed or 
not pursued to their end. It is also usually why witnesses re-
fuse to cooperate in investigations or testify at trials, critical 
evidence is lost, or defendants are suddenly reassigned or dis-
appear. This regrettable situation often leaves prosecutors with 
no choice but to dismiss the case. Accordingly, mentors should 
remain flexible and understand that intimidation may be the 
primary reason some high-level matters are never pursued.88 
3. Confessions 
ANA prosecutors rely heavily on confessions to prove their 
cases.89 This reliance, in large part, is historically and cultural-
ly based on Islamic law teachings whereby confessions made in 
                                                                                                             
 84. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-5. 
 85. Id. at 3-7. 
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 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 3-6. 
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an open court before God are rarely challenged.90 With this in 
mind, better-informed defendants, usually senior-ranking offi-
cials in high-profile corruption cases, will simply refuse to 
speak, knowing that, as a result of this refusal, the prosecutors 
or investigators will most likely abandon their case. 
Fortunately, ANA prosecutors today are starting to trend 
away from this past accepted practice, particularly as they de-
velop their advocacy and case-development skills. Legal men-
tors can work with prosecutors on developing cases that do not 
need confessions to succeed in court. 
4. Illiteracy 
Illiteracy presents yet another interesting challenge for legal 
mentors, especially when training ANA soldiers on rules of en-
gagement, laws of armed conflict, NJP, and ethics. On a larger 
scale, illiteracy within the ANA negatively impacts the overall 
U.S. mission in Afghanistan, albeit indirectly. 
Although efforts are underway to increase the literacy rate,91 
illiteracy and an aversion to writing among those who are lit-
erate has left the ANA with inadequate to almost-nonexistent 
record keeping.92 As a result, many form-driven processes, such 
as counseling statements, promotions, NJPs, and payroll rec-
ords, which a U.S.-military trained Judge Advocate might take 
for granted, have suffered. When routine paperwork is not 
completed, soldiers might miss pay or promotions, or they 
might be wrongly punished (or so they believe), leaving them 
feeling disconnected and discouraged. These discouraged, un-
paid soldiers might react by going AWOL, deserting, or joining 
the insurgency. This, in turn, leaves the ANA undermanned, 
poorly motivated, and generally unable to defend its country 
against the insurgency, ultimately preventing it from effective-
ly taking responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. Thus, 
poor record keeping causes an unintentional domino effect 
within the ANA, with the effect worsening as it moves down 
the chain. 
                                                                                                             
 90. See Rashid Ahmad, Admission/Confession: A Comparative Study of 
Islamic and Pakistani Laws of Evidence, THE CLUTE INST., 164–65 (Jan. 
2011), 
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While legal mentors cannot directly combat illiteracy within 
the ANA, they can provide the OSJA with PowerPoint presen-
tations and training that cover critical legal subjects and are 
geared toward the illiterate ANA soldier.93 
5. Leadership 
Lack of experienced leaders possessing any formal military 
training is another challenge to mentoring the ANA. 
Prior to the recent efforts to build a new Afghan National 
Army, there had essentially been no Afghan Army since the 
Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, leaving many former mujahe-
deen fighters, warlords, and militia to serve as officers and 
non-commissioned officers (“NCOs”).94 Many ANA commanders 
and even SJAs got their positions through patronage, intimida-
tion, bribery, or some other means of influence.95 This has re-
sulted in many senior leaders with little to no formal education 
or military training.96 For example, when I arrived at the Corps 
to which I had been assigned, the SJA was not a lawyer or even 
trained in the law. He was a former mujahedeen artillery bat-
talion commander suspected by many throughout the Corps as 
being corrupt. Fortunately, before the end of my term, the ANA 
Judge Advocate General replaced him with a well-respected 
former judge and law professor. 
“This lack of training, combined with a promotion system 
that favors influence peddling and patronage, remains an im-
pediment to ANA leadership development.”97 Lack of experi-
enced leaders poses a unique challenge for legal mentors trying 
to instill discipline and respect for the rule of law within the 
ANA. 
6. The Soviet Model 
The senior leaders in the ANA who have previous military 
experience or training received it during the days of the Soviet 
occupation, leaving a leadership model built largely on Soviet 
                                                                                                             
 93. See id. at 2-30. 
 94. Id. at 3-2. 
 95. Id. at 2-29, 3-8. It is not uncommon for senior officers to buy their posi-
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tion. Id. at. 2-29. 
 96. See id. at 2-30, 3-8. Many leaders also consider training a waste of time 
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 97. Id. at 3-8. 
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military tradition.98 Under this system, NCOs have very little 
authority or decision-making ability, if any.99 Because leaders 
do not have authority and are not expected to make decisions, 
they are not held accountable for the actions of their subordi-
nates.100 This way, they remain in charge until something is 
amiss, when they can then shift the blame to those beneath 
them.101 Hence, leaders are reluctant to make recommended 
changes, because enacting change means they take on the risk 
of failure, whereas remaining with the status quo means they 
can simply blame the underlying problem on someone else.102 
In other words, under the Soviet model, leaders prefer to do 
nothing, which poses a challenge for legal mentors looking to 
effect change.103 
7. Working with Coalition Partners 
Legal mentors will often work with coalition partners, either 
when serving as part of an OMLT, or when working alongside 
coalition teams. Working with coalition members who have 
their own priorities and cultural idiosyncrasies offers a new set 
of challenges. 
In Afghanistan, the country is divided into Regional Com-
mands (“RCs”), with each RC commanded by a different NATO 
commander.104 The coalition commander of the RC also usually 
heads the OMLT assigned to the region. In addition, depending 
on where the Corps is located, the battle-space commander, in 
other words, the commander in charge of the particular RC or 
portion thereof, may be a coalition commander.105 Thus, coali-
tion members work in a number of settings in Afghanistan. 
Afghans have definite perceptions of coalition members, some 
positive, but many negative. Some perceptions may be histori-
cally based (as is the case with the British or Russians), while 
others may be culturally or linguistically based. These percep-
tions may affect how Afghans interact with the legal mentor or 
                                                                                                             
 98. See id. at 3-9. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 3-10. 
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 104. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 30. 
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how the mentor addresses them, which could impact the entire 
mission. 
At other times, the mentor will need support from a coalition 
or OMLT partner, but for one reason or another, it does not 
come. Hence, legal mentors should remember that diplomacy is 
just as important when working with coalition partners as it is 
when dealing with Afghans. 
8. Other Rule of Law Operators in the Battle-Space 
In addition to the ANA legal mentor, there are other organi-
zations conducting similar rule of law mentoring in the battle-
space.106 Unlike ANA mentors, these operators work within the 
civilian rule of law arena and may include the following: Bri-
gade Combat Teams (“BCTs”), NATO Rule of Law Field Sup-
port Mission (“NROLFSM”), the Department of State—Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(“DOS/INL”), U.S. Agency for International Development 
(“USAID”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Provisional Re-
construction Teams (“PRTs”), and the United Nations Assis-
tance Mission Afghanistan (“UNAMA”).107 Since there may be 
times when the legal mentors’ interests intersect with those of 
the civilian operators’, or when information gained from these 
operators located at the regional and provincial levels is helpful 
to the legal mentors, getting to know them could prove benefi-
cial.108 
BCTs and NROLFSM are military-led and provide civilian 
rule of law support. BCTs are co-located at the brigade-level 
with their own rule of law personnel and routinely engage with 
local civilian provincial and appellate judges.109 NROLFSM, on 
the other hand, does not engage in rule of law advising, men-
toring, or training.110 Instead, it coordinates civilian and mili-
tary rule of law efforts with DOS counterparts focusing on five 
main areas: 
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[1] Security—for civilian rule of law experts; [2] Coordina-
tion—to facilitate movements of the experts in conjunction 
with other actors also working in the area in Afghanistan, 
and to provide a liaison and outreach function; [3] Movement 
support—such as secure convoys; [4] Engineering support—
for possible infrastructure upgrades at designated Rule of 
Law facilities; and [5] Oversight of the contractual process—
in connection with the engineering support and in accordance 
with current ISAF practices.111 
The U.S. civilian agencies providing civilian rule of law sup-
port are DOS/INL, USAID, and DOJ. DOS/INL works and op-
erates through two programs: (1) the Justice Sector Support 
Program (“JSSP”), which provides regional training programs 
and supports the Afghan Attorney General’s Office and the 
Ministry of Justice, and (2) the Corrections Systems Support 
Program (“CSSP”) which “supports the prison system, develops 
corrections infrastructure, and provides training.”112 In addi-
tion, USAID supports the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as-
sists in reforming the law, and helps the Afghans draft legisla-
tion.113 Finally, “DOJ has the lead with the Criminal Justice 
Task Force (the specialist counternarcotics task force), the An-
ti-Corruption Unit in the Attorney General’s Office, and the 
U.S. Marshals Service protection efforts.”114 
To a lesser extent, PRTs are also involved in rule of law ef-
forts.115 PRTs “are civil-military organizations (CMOs) that are 
staffed by U.S. government (USG) civilian and military per-
sonnel to assist foreign provincial governments with their re-
construction efforts; their security and rule of law efforts; and 
their political and economic development.”116 While a PRT 
might not have a coordinator dedicated to civilian rule of law 
efforts (although this may change), “PRTs can contribute to 
justice reform in Afghanistan [by b]uilding judicial infrastruc-
ture, [f]acilitating information-sharing (PRTs are popular with 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. 
 112. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 201. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 201–04. PRTs are the “principal vehicle to leverage the in-
ternational community and Afghan government reconstruction and develop-
ment programs.” Id. at 202. Currently there are twenty-five teams scattered 
throughout most of the thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan; twelve are led 
by the United States. Id. at 201. 
 116. See id. at 193. 
2012] A LEGAL MENTOR IN AFGHANISTAN 259 
Afghan nationals, giving them good situational awareness), 
[a]dvising on the best use of donor funds, [and h]elping to coor-
dinate reconstruction efforts with the UNAMA.”117 
Finally, of the various non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) conducting rule of law operations, UNAMA is most 
prevalent,118 having its own mandate “to lead the international 
civilian efforts . . . [and] to support and strengthen efforts to 
improve governance and the rule of law.”119 Their usefulness 
may depend upon the RC to which they are assigned. 
Because there are so many organizations conducting rule of 
law operations in the battle-space, coordination and unity of 
effort is sometimes required. For instance, in Afghanistan, 
ANA soldiers convicted to confinement may spend their term in 
civilian prisons.120 As a result, there may be times when coor-
dination between the mentor and the civilian rule of law coun-
terparts (NROLFSM, CSSP, or JSSP) will be needed if a visit 
to or information about a prison is requested. At other times, 
coordination among the mentor and the agencies may be need-
ed because the ANA and civilian authorities have concurrent 
jurisdiction (e.g., when an ANA soldier commits a civilian of-
fense off-post and off-duty, or if an ANA picks up and detains a 
Taliban or al-Qaeda suspect, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
National Directorate of Security).121 
9. Working with Interpreters 
An interpreter (or linguist) can be a mentor’s greatest as-
set.122 In fact, without an effective interpreter, the legal mentor 
could find himself in trouble. Poor interpreters have led to 
mentors being dismissed or discounted by their principals 
simply because of poor translation or poor protocol. Advising 
through an interpreter is a skill that must be developed.123 A 
linguist with a lay background offers different capabilities than 
one with a legal background. An “uneducated or otherwise un-
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sophisticated interpreter” can complicate a relationship and 
potentially sabotage the mission.124 
There are many legal terms that lawyers use as common-
speak that do not have equivalents in Dari or Pashto, the main 
languages of Afghanistan.125 For instance, there are no Dari 
words for defendant or plaintiff; nor are there words for mis-
demeanor or felony. Instead, the legal community in Afghani-
stan uses Arabic words just as we use Latin words in the Eng-
lish legal system. Other words do not have literal translations: 
the Supreme Court is the “clean court”; when “charges” are re-
ferred, there is an “accusation”; an attorney does not dismiss a 
case, he “exits” it. In one instance, an attorney intended to 
speak of keeping a client’s confidentiality; however, the inter-
preter (who happened to have no legal background) translated 
the idea as “keeping secrets from your client.” In this particular 
example, one translation is an ethical duty, and the other is 
ethical grounds for sanctions. 
 It is also important to use the same interpreter, espe-
cially if he routinely delivers quality services.126 In most in-
stances, the ANA principals with whom mentors work will 
have already developed a concurrent relationship with the in-
terpreter from prior mentors.127 This prior relationship can 
serve as a bridge for introductions and may even help curry fa-
vor.128 
The SJA, his key staff, the judges, and key personnel in the 
Corps (particularly senior leadership) should keep the inter-
preter’s cell phone number available, and vice-versa, in the 
event someone needs to contact the mentor or the mentor needs 
to schedule a meeting. A good Rolodex and contacts with key 
ANA personnel is an essential element for success.129 
There are several tips legal mentors should keep in mind 
when using an interpreter. Mentors should speak to the person 
addressed, not to the interpreter.130 Look at the addressee 
when speaking. Make sure the interpreter only translates what 
is said and nothing more. Keep sentences short to avoid over-
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whelming the interpreter.131 Do not allow for adjustments, un-
less it is culturally necessary or something said is inappropri-
ate. Also be careful as to word choice and using sayings which 
are often not translated well or misunderstood. A good inter-
preter can help overcome these obstacles. The interpreter 
should always advise if he hears or believes there may be a 
dangerous situation. Do not curse or use profanity. Many Af-
ghans understand some English, and if they hear profanity, 
they may believe they are being insulted. Similarly, do not al-
low the interpreter to hold private discussions with the princi-
pals and do not hold private conversations with the interpreter 
because it is considered impolite or even offensive unless the 
discussion is translated.132 Finally, always speak clearly and 
simply. 
10.  Conflicts of Interest 
While gaining trust is paramount for success as a legal men-
tor, trust does not create a fiduciary relationship between the 
legal mentor and his principal. In fact, legal mentors do not 
have fiduciary relationships with any members of the ANA. As 
such, no privileges flow from this relationship, and there 
should be no conflicts of interest. 
During the course of the deployment, legal mentors may en-
counter instances where information gained through the ANA 
relationship must be compromised to Coalition Forces. If ever 
in doubt, it is always best to consult with the IJC chain of 
command, starting with the IJC SJA. 
11.  Corruption 
Cultural challenges become especially frustrating considering 
the epidemic high-level government corruption that may at 
times seem a culturally-accepted means for conducting busi-
ness.133 Corruption is one of the greatest concerns for gaining 
stability in Afghanistan.134 Corruption permeates every level of 
the ANA and Ministry of Defense.135 It is often rationalized be-
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cause of the high risks and low pay for ANA soldiers.136 Many 
in the ANA do not see it as a problem per se but rather as a 
means of survival.137 Legal mentors who encounter corruption 
should encourage commanders to conduct investigations.138 
Discovering corruption is often harder than simply conduct-
ing an investigation, however, and investigations often present 
their own challenges, including obstruction by commanders. 
One method for discovering corruption is through observing 
relationships and the seemingly casual discussions that may 
flow from them. Thus, it is important for legal mentors to de-
velop close, professional relationships with the SJA, the Crimi-
nal Investigation Division (“CID”) chief, the Inspector General 
(“IG”) mentor, the hospital mentors, the Military Police (“MP”) 
chief (and his mentor, if applicable), the finance mentor, the 
Garrison Commander, the G2 Chief (and his mentor), the G3 
Chief (and his mentor), the Brigade Commanders, and the 
Corps Commander. Depending on the Corps, there may be oth-
er liaisons that may be of help as well. 
To combat corruption, mentors should incorporate ethics into 
discussions whenever possible, using analogies to illustrate 
keys points.139 Lecturing should generally be avoided.140 One 
legal advisor was particularly effective by equating corruption 
with support for the insurgency, pointing out that every dollar 
taken through corruption feeds the insurgency ten-fold, thus 
diminishing ANA efforts. 
Finally, the SJA should refer cases where senior commanders 
are implicated to his higher chain of command, in particular to 
the ANA Judge Advocate General, for guidance or referral of 
charges. This way the SJA can avoid investigating the same 
commander with whom he has, and may continue to have, a 
professional relationship. 
12.  Logistics 
In most instances, the ANA OSJAs lack adequate resources, 
supplies, technology, and even paper.141 In fact, until recently, 
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most did not even have copies of the military codes, laws, or 
regulations that one would expect to find in an SJA office. 
Besides lacking equipment and supplies, most SJA offices are 
not fully or well staffed either. Each OSJA has a manning re-
quirement (or tashkil)142 that was designed for a much smaller 
Corps. Cases frequently cannot be investigated or tried for lack 
of investigators or investigator kits, defense counsel, or judges. 
These logistical difficulties often affect investigations. For ex-
ample, investigators might not be able to secure a crime scene 
or preserve evidence because they do not have vehicles and 
thus cannot get there fast enough. Unreasonable delays be-
tween the time an accused is incarcerated and the time he is 
charged are also common because of these logistical challenges. 
Logistical restrictions can also affect the legal mentor’s mis-
sion, particularly when needing to travel outside the perimeter 
(e.g., visiting the civilian jail or meeting with ANP, civilian 
judges, or politicians) because security concerns limit obtaining 
vehicles and a security detail. 
13.  Insurgency 
Finally, the greatest challenge for the mentor in the battle-
space will be the insurgency. Meeting and addressing all of the 
aforementioned challenges, and then some, while fighting an 
insurgency is incredibly difficult.143 
In addition to fighting an insurgency, there is the ever-
present threat of infiltration of the ANA base.144 There have 
been instances when units have been comprised of soldiers who 
were former Taliban fighters, from pro-Taliban villages, or 
compromised by intimidation, bribery, or corruption.145 
Every day I mentored there was a continuous threat of an at-
tack, whether from my principal, someone in his office, or 
someone that had infiltrated the ANA compound. In fact, just 
as I was arriving in theater, a mentor and several other coali-
tion members were shot and killed by their ANA principal. I do 
not know the specifics of the attack (a large part of the details 
remain classified), but I do know that subsequent to those kill-
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ings, mentors remained on a heightened state of preparedness 
when working with the ANA. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
A. Successful Practices 
a. “Strive to understand the culture and the law, both in the-
ory and in practice.”146 For Afghans, God, family, village, and 
tribe all take priority before country. Learn the civilian civil 
code and basic Shari’a law since both are relevant sources of 
the ANA military justice code. Failing to know or understand 
the history, culture, or law will be considered an exploitable 
weakness. Learn how cases develop and how they are investi-
gated; how the SJA reviews investigations and assigns cases 
for prosecution; how prosecutors work their cases and draft and 
submit a charge sheet; how the Court intakes cases and the ef-
fect of the Court’s review; how defense counsel investigate, 
prepare, and work cases; and finally, learn and understand the 
prosecutor’s, defense counsel’s, and court’s roles at trial. 
b. Learn the pressure points of the ANA military justice sys-
tem. These include the effect of ethnic relationships among the 
victim, suspect, chain of command, SJA, and judiciary; the po-
tential an accused, a witness, or a victim may be influenced by 
one of his superiors; the level of corruption within the ANA mil-
itary; the potential for intimidation by senior officials of prose-
cutors, military judges, CID investigators, and witnesses; and 
the potential level of incompetence, particularly in the investi-
gation phase. 
c. “Establish and maintain strong, open, and trusting rela-
tionships,” not just with the ANA but also with the inter-
agency, coalition, and NGO partners as well.147 Make a point to 
meet with the other rule of law actors. By getting out and at-
tending rule of law working groups outside the base, you will 
gain valuable insight into how other actors operate in the rule 
of law environment, in addition to gaining leverage for coordi-
nating future rule of law efforts. There is no local rule of law 
problem in a country with a national government developing as 
quickly as Afghanistan’s. Any project that ignores the neces-
sary relationships among foreign and host nation stakeholders 
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is bound to fail in the long run, if for no other reason than there 
will be no national support to sustain it. 
d. Similarly, get to know the key mentors and their princi-
ples, in particular the Corps Commander, Garrison Command-
er, Garrison tenant Commanders, G2, G3, Corps finance Chief, 
IG, and MP Chief. The mentors can provide valuable insight 
into ANA issues that are particularly relevant to the legal ad-
visor and OSJA. At the same time, encourage the SJA to forge 
his own relationships with the ANA principals and their men-
tors. 
e. When giving advice or opinions, be clear and respectful, 
providing rationale for your thoughts. Avoid giving rash advice 
based on naiveté (which is part of the motivation for under-
standing the culture and history). When a dissenting opinion is 
based on sound, rational reasoning, legal advisors will gain the 
trust and respect of their principals. 
f. Understand that an advisor’s “power” derives from the abil-
ity to pass along information and spot issues for senior-ranking 
officials at both ISAF and the Ministry of Defense. This ability 
should be used prudently. Do not threaten its use lightly. Seek 
this avenue only when convinced higher echelons (at least on 
the coalition side) will agree that the issue is sufficiently im-
portant to merit their intervention. 
g. Keep matters simple.148 Pursue simple and practical sys-
tems for training and mentoring.149 Be honest and succinct and 
try to keep meetings short. Rather than lecturing, mentors 
should use analogies and discussion points to illustrate im-
portant points. Although “infrastructure and process are im-
portant,” the primary focus should be on the people through 
“educating, developing, mentoring, and empowering” the 
ANA.150 
h. Words and word choice matter. Be careful what is said in 
English. Be professional. Use appropriate language. Many Af-
ghans understand English and words taken out of context may 
be misconstrued. 
i. Provide incentives for producing. Objectives should be of-
fered to the ANA as a personal incentive. Remember where the 
Afghan priorities lie (God, family, tribe). Consider how Af-
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ghans’ actions may be influenced by other factors, such as loy-
alties (e.g., “tribal, ethnic, religious, bureaucratic, financial”); 
personal obligations (e.g., financial, or to their tribe, ethnicity, 
or religion); and third-party influences inimical to the rule of 
law (e.g., “corruption, poverty, foreign influences, crime, fear, 
insurgency, lack of education”).151 
j. Instill in commanders the necessity for following the rule of 
law. Remind commanders to utilize the SJAs as the principal 
rule of law advisors and also remind SJAs how they can mini-
mize their own personal exposure for violations. 
k. Remember the objective is not for the ANA to look like the 
U.S. Army, but rather for the ANA to be a professional and 
competent military organization in a form appropriate for Af-
ghanistan.152 
l. Utilize your own strengths to your advantage. Everyone 
will approach the position and address issues from different 
angles as defined by their prism of personal experience. Use 
that past experience as leverage for accomplishing tasks. Do 
not expect too much. Set realistic goals. The levels of bureau-
cracy in Afghanistan create an incredibly slow process, so pa-
tience is a pre-requisite for success. 
B.  Unsuccessful practices 
a. Do not think you know everything. Remain flexible and 
open minded. This is not Iraq and even if you have been to Af-
ghanistan before, the landscape changes almost daily. Do not 
try to go it alone by disregarding the expertise and experience 
of others. Know, understand, and use, when applicable, all 
available resources to your advantage. The mission is not new 
and many of the issues you encounter have been previously ad-
dressed by others. Do your research before embarking on a new 
quest. Besides the civilian rule of law operators, the Afghans 
can provide a valuable resource. They have been here the long-
est and many, including your interpreter, have the institution-
al memory on how things have been done for your RC. 
b. Failing to adhere to cultural prerequisites or etiquette or 
disregarding cultural advice (e.g., from the linguist) can prove 
devastating and has, at times, doomed legal advisors. 
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c. Do not tell the principal what he “has” to do. Instead guide 
them by asking questions, for example, have they done X or 
thought of Y? This way they think of the issues and solutions 
themselves and can take responsibility for the plan. 
d. Do not promise things that may not, or cannot, happen. By 
failing to deliver, credibility is lost and may not be recovered. 
Rather, say that you will “look into it.” There is a perception 
among Afghans that Americans promise but do not deliver. 
Similarly, failing to follow-up on tasks or promises is another 
means to lose credibility and trust. 
e. Keep a professional attitude and do not let things get per-
sonal. Many suggestions will be ignored or disregarded. Under-
stand why a suggestion was disregarded. Knowing the culture 
and how things operate in Afghanistan and how tasks are ac-
complished may give better insight into how suggestions 
should be made next time. 
f. Do not undermine the SJA or anyone of authority in front 
of subordinates. 
g. You are not a fiduciary to the SJA or the judiciary. Despite 
what some may think, you represent the United States and as 
such your duty of loyalty and confidences run to it, not to the 
ANA. 
CONCLUSION 
Key to U.S. policy for Afghanistan is training, partnering 
with, and mentoring the ANA so it can self-sustain and be ca-
pable of defending its country from the insurgency that has be-
set Afghanistan for the last ten years. Developing the ANA 
Corps OSJA into a self-sufficient legal office is a critical com-
ponent of this policy. An OSJA capable of providing accurate 
and timely advice for a well-disciplined Corps, and that re-
spects the rule of law and complies with the laws of armed con-
flict and rules of engagement, will eventually be able to take 
responsibility for the security of its respective region, which 
will lead to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces 
from the region. 
Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal mentors will en-
counter many challenges unique to Afghanistan while fighting 
an ongoing insurgency. Before deploying, Judge Advocates 
should spend a significant amount of time learning and under-
standing the history, culture, law, and basic political frame-
work of post-conflict operations and be ready to develop alli-
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ances with other legal rule of law operators in the region. It is 
my hope that with this information, Judge Advocates deploying 
as ANA legal mentors will be well equipped and prepared to 
handle any of the challenges expected in theater. 
